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Abstract
This paper examines the role of policy entrepreneurs and global activists in shaping the international market for antiretroviral drugs 
to combat HIV/AIDS. When ARVs first came on the market in the 1990s they were exceedingly expensive; the cost of treatment 
was upwards of $10,000 per year. These drugs were thus accessible only to those patients who had high incomes.  But in 2006, 
the “international community,” meeting at a United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS), made an astonishing 
pledge to those who were infected with HIV. It proclaimed that there should be universal access to ARV treatment. This UNGASS, 
following up on an earlier historic UN special session devoted entirely to AIDS in 2001, marked the first time in history that the 
international community pledged itself to chronic care for the ill, which in this case includes the approximately 30 million people 
around the world estimated to be HIV positive. How do we explain the transformation of ARVs from private goods, which only 
a few could afford, into merit goods that were (at least declaratively) to be made available to everyone? In other words, how does a 
norm of “universal access to treatment”—that no person should be denied these life-extending drugs—become the ethical basis for 
global public policy with respect to pharmaceutical allocation? What are the lessons of the ARV story for other global issues? These 
are the primary questions we explore in this paper. Briefly, we argue that the policy entrepreneurs and activists who promoted the 
creation of a universal access to treatment regime—of the transformation of ARVs into global merit goods—relied on a combination 
of moral arguments and ideas with favorable material circumstances. From the ethical perspective, the task of these entrepreneurs 
was to convince the “international community” that access to ARVs was a “human right,” or conversely to convince decision-makers 
that it was morally wrong to allocate these life-enhancing drugs solely on the basis of ability to pay. But from a material standpoint, 
these arguments were greatly facilitated by the lowering prices of ARVs caused by a combination of differential pricing (that is, lower 
prices for drugs in the developing world than in the advanced welfare states) and competition from generics producers, coupled with 
increases in foreign aid spending devoted to HIV/AIDS and other diseases.
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MAKING MARKETS FOR MERIT GOODS: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTIRETROVIRALS 
 
 
“The scale-up of antiretroviral therapy is the most ambitious public health undertaking of 
our lifetimes. We are making history…” (Gonsalves 2008) 
 
  
This paper examines the role of policy entrepreneurs and global activists in 
shaping the international market for antiretroviral drugs to combat HIV/AIDS. When 
ARVs first came on the market in the 1990s they were exceedingly expensive; the cost of 
treatment was upwards of $10,000 per year. These drugs were thus only accessible to 
those with high incomes or exceptionally good health insurance, and gay activist 
groups—notably the militant organization ACT-UP—targeted pharmaceutical companies 
and insurance providers, along with government agencies like the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), in their efforts to obtain greater accessibility for AIDS victims 
through reduced prices, quicker approval processes for new therapies, and better 
coverage for this disease (d'Adesky 2004; Kramer 2003; Johnson and Murray 1988; 
Smith and Siplon 2006). This “first-generation” of AIDS activists, however, operated 
primarily in the United States and France (and later to great political effect in Brazil and 
South Africa), and they were mainly domestic—as opposed to global or cosmopolitan—
in their political orientation, meaning that the changes they sought from government and 
business regarding expanded ARV access were focused on their home polities rather than 




But in the year 2006, the “international community,” meeting as a United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS), made an astonishing pledge to those who 
were infected with HIV. It declared that there should be universal access to ARV 
treatment. This UNGASS, following up on an earlier historic UN special session devoted 
entirely to AIDS in 2001, marks the first time in history that the international community 
has set a policy goal of chronic care for the ill—of establishing what Mead Over has 
labelled an international “entitlement scheme” (Over 2008)—which in this specific case 
includes the approximately 30 million people around the world estimated to be HIV 
positive (UN General Assembly 2006). 
How do we explain the transformation of ARVs from private goods, which only a 
very few victims of AIDS could afford, into merit goods or entitlements, defined as 
goods that should be made available to everyone, irrespective of their ability to pay for 
them (Musgrave 1959)? In other words, how does a norm of “universal access to 
treatment”—that no person should be denied life-extending drugs—become the ethical 
basis for global public policy with respect to pharmaceutical allocation? These are the 
primary questions we explore in this paper. 
Briefly, we argue that the policy entrepreneurs and activists who promoted the 
creation of a universal access to treatment regime did so by using compelling moral 
arguments while enjoying favorable material conditions or circumstances. From the 
ethical perspective, the task of these entrepreneurs was to convince political leaders and 
the broader public that it was morally wrong to allocate antiretroviral drugs solely on the 
basis of an individual’s ability to pay. From a material standpoint, these arguments were 




by a combination of differential pricing strategies by pharmaceutical manufacturers (that 
is, lower prices for drugs in the developing world than in the advanced welfare states) and 
price competition from generics producers of these drugs, coupled with increases in 
foreign aid spending devoted to HIV/AIDS and other diseases—changes that activists 
helped to bring about. In short, by fusing the moral and the material realms into an 
effective political campaign, AIDS activists transformed antiretroviral medicines into 
global merit goods. A crucial question for the future, however, concerns the 
sustainability of the universal access to treatment regime given the “Great Recession” 
that began in 2008, “donor fatigue” with respect to AIDS and the emergence of other 
priorities, and the growing demand for “next generation” therapies as existing treatments 
lose their effectiveness. 
 Beyond its importance to all those concerned with HIV/AIDS and global public 
health, we believe that the ARV case also has relevance well beyond those particular 
spheres. After all, in recent years activists have demanded that, inter alia, education, bed 
nets, clean water, sanitation, and many other goods be made available to every individual, 
irrespective of their ability to pay. But few if any of these demands have been met by 
multilateral declarations of support which are then backed by ample funding. This fact 
raises the question: under what circumstances does the international community make 
both the political and financial commitment that is required to generate global merit 
goods? Based on the AIDS case, we hypothesize that the bigger the political coalition in 
support of the merit good, the more likely that good is to emerge. And while that 
statement may sound trivial or self-evident, we would do well to recall that many 




widespread support that is needed to bring about significant social change. Creating such 
a coalition, we note, is difficult enough in the specific context of most nation-states (think 
of health policy reform in the United States), but it must be all the more challenging 
when activists must work trans-nationally, confronting different legal and cultural norms 
in the process. And as with ARVs, any campaign to bring about universal access to the 
provision of a given good must consider the sustainability of the funding stream. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. First, a brief summary history of the political 
response to AIDS in the developing world is provided by way of background. Second, we 
explain why AIDS treatment constitutes a puzzle for scholars. Third, we sketch a model 
of the supply and demand of global merit goods, using ARVs as our example. In the 
fourth section, we provide a provisional explanation that accounts for the relative success 
of the AIDS treatment campaign compared to other advocacy efforts. We conclude with a 
discussion of the applicability of the ARV case as a model for other health issues and 
other issue-areas in the global economy.  
 
The Global Politics of AIDS: A Brief History 
The AIDS crisis is a tragedy of epic proportions. By 2007, more than 25 million 
people had reportedly died from AIDS, 2 million of them in that year alone.
1 Another 33 
million were living with the virus. There were an estimated 2.7 million new infections in 
2007, 1.9 million of them in sub-Saharan Africa, the epicenter of the pandemic (UNAIDS 
2008b). In 2004, AIDS was the leading cause of death worldwide for people aged 15-59 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2005). In this section we provide a brief overview of the 
                                                 
1 By way of comparison, the Black Death killed about 25 million in the 14
th century, possibly as much as 




international community’s response to this tragedy, which ultimately led to the “political 
declaration” made by the members of the United Nations in 2006 that antiretrovirals 
should be made available on the basis of universal access.  
Despite the fact that AIDS was first identified in the 1980s, public policy to attack 
the disease lagged far behind its spread for many years, at least in part because the 
majority of its victims—which included the so-called “4-H Club” of homosexuals, 
Haitians, heroin addicts, and hemophiliacs—were outside the mainstream of industrial 
world polities (Behrman 2004). In the United States, President Ronald Reagan saw little 
political gain from attacking a disease that was mainly associated with the gay lifestyle, 
and some evangelical ministers even preached that AIDS was God’s vengeance on 
homosexual men. As a consequence, few health policy leaders within the administration 
were willing to increase domestic much less international funding for AIDS in any 
significant way (Garrett 1994). This situation would be surprisingly slow to change, and 
even President Bill Clinton during the 1990s was accused by AIDS activists of failing to 
give the disease the policy attention they believe it deserved (Schwartz 1994). 
By the turn of the millennium, however, a confluence of events created the 
impetus for broader international action to address the pandemic. By this time, AIDS had 
in fact been largely contained within the advanced industrialized countries, thanks to a 
combination of prevention strategies and improved treatment options based on 
antiretroviral medications. With the invention of new drug treatment therapies, and with 
the near universal extension of these drugs to AIDS sufferers throughout the advanced 
industrialized world, the number of people dying from AIDS fell dramatically and instead 




indefinitely. But with these ARV drugs costing more than $10,000 a year as late as 2000, 
the number of people with access to them in the developing world was, of course, 
miniscule, and so AIDS would continue its deadly spread there unabated. 
For reasons we will now explore, this population would not be allowed to die 
silently, and a growing chorus of activists, policy entrepreneurs, and academics began to 
call for expanded access to treatment. Champions of developing world AIDS victims 
within international organizations, like the late Jonathan Mann of the World Health 
Organization and Peter Piot of UNAIDS (the United Nations umbrella agency which 
focuses on global AIDS) used their well-springs of knowledge, charisma, and energy to 
bring the crisis to the attention of senior decision-makers. In so doing, they used a variety 
of medical, economic, ethical, and security-related arguments about why antiretroviral 
treatment should be made available to the poor, drawing together a broad political 
coalition in favor of developing world access to ARVs (Piot 2009). Indeed, the fact that 
AIDS touched so many “nerves” in so many different communities—from health workers 
to those in the defense and intelligence fields—greatly facilitated the task of coalition 
building and, in turn, the building of political support for a universal access to treatment 
regime (Elster 1993, makes a similar point about the importance of political coalitions in 
the advanced welfare states with respect to how scarce resoures, like health care or elite 
higher education, get allocated). These actors also relied on a growing body of evidence 
concerning the impact that AIDS was having throughout the developing world. Academic 
sociologists like Tony Barnett documented the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS on 
communities in Africa (Barnett and Whiteside 2002), while economists like Jeffrey Sachs 




(Attaran and Sachs 2001). Sustained media coverage of global AIDS in 1999 and 2000, 
led by such journalists as Laurie Garrett at Newsday and Barton Gellman at the 
Washington Post, brought the human tragedy onto the front pages of the world’s leading 
newspapers. All these efforts would combine to help push the issue higher onto the policy 
agendas of both public officials and of the activist community (Behrman 2004; Gellman 
2000).  
At the same time, the success in relatively poor countries like Brazil and Haiti in 
putting HIV-positive individuals on treatment, and Uganda’s reportedly successful AIDS 
prevention program, helped make the case that global action could in fact be effective, 
thus negating the arguments made by some prominent public officials (like USAID 
Administrator Andrew Natsios) that ARVs required the kind of medical infrastructure 
that was only found in the industrial world. 
  As AIDS worked its grim way around the world, leaving in its train a growing 
number of casualties, the United Nations Security Council in 2000 devoted a meeting 
solely to disease, calling it a threat to peace and security. Soon after, in July 2000, 
Durban hosted the first international conference on AIDS to be held in Africa. This 
gathering was widely regarded by the AIDS community as the decisive turning point at 
which the idea of extending treatment to the developing world was deemed both 
medically feasible and morally necessary, since many of the developing world success 
stories with respect to treatment were presented at this time (Garrett 2009).   
With the idea of broader access to ARV treatment now advancing on the 
international agenda, policy entrepreneurs like Peter Piot sought political support from 




(Piot 2009). As we will show in a following section, these efforts by policy entrepreneurs 
and activists were ultimately about the transformation of ARVs from private goods which 
only the wealthy could purchase to merit goods that were available to everyone. In 
essence, they were focused on the political construction of a universal ARV market 
(Bartley 2007, 299). Thus, organizations like Doctors without Borders, Health GAP, 
Oxfam, and the Consumer Project on Technology (CPT) focused their advocacy work 
largely on loosening the market constraints imposed by the regime governing trade in 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS) on access to essential medicines, and they would play 
an important role providing legal and economic advice to developing countries with 
respect to challenging international trade laws. Other groups like the Global Aids 
Alliance, ACT-UP, and South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign (founded in 1998) 
would also achieve a critical voice with national governments in the debates over 
universal access to ARVs.  
These movements would further benefit from the political work of the broader 
non-governmental development community. In particular, as the Jubilee 2000 campaign 
wound down (which had focused on debt relief for the developing world), many of the 
activists associated with this cause began turning their attention to AIDS. Perhaps most 
prominently, the Irish pop star Bono formed DATA (Debt Aids Trade Africa) in 2002, 
which quickly became one of the leading organizations engaged on the issue; indeed, 
President George W. Bush among other American political leaders was strongly 
influenced by Bono (who, fortuitously, was able to speak to them on a “Christian to 
Christian” basis) on global AIDS policy, as we will discuss in further detail below 




This broad ethical movement would also receive a tremendous boost at the turn of 
the millennium with the emergence of low-cost generic versions of ARV drugs, produced 
by manufacturers in such countries as Brazil and India. The success of the Brazilian 
government’s campaign to treat the nation’s AIDS victims with generics demonstrated 
that these drugs were not only effective in the developing world setting, but also that the 
costs of treatment could be contained. As a result, campaigners could begin to put a 
realistic price tag on the goal of universal access, and it was one that seemed within reach 
of the industrial world’s foreign aid programs.  
These ongoing campaigns gradually began to bear fruit. In 2001, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Doha elaborated the rights of poor countries to override 
pharmaceutical patents and issue compulsory licenses for public health emergencies, and 
it extended the transition period from 2006 to 2016 within which least-developed 
countries had to offer patent protection to the pharmaceutical industry under the 
provisions of the TRIPS regime; in these negotiations developing countries were advised 
by such organizations as Oxfam and CPT (Fleet and N'Daw 2008). As the WTO began to 
support greater flexibility for developing countries to produce and later to import “cheap” 
generic ARVs, international donors began to scale up their commitments to finance 
treatment in the developing world. 
Prior to 2002, the international community had provided only paltry resources 
aimed at the HIV/AIDS crisis in the developing world. As already noted, Attaran and  
Sachs had shown that less than $200 million a year was being spent on global HIV/AIDS 
activities (Attaran and Sachs 2001, 57). They suggested that a multi-billion dollar fund 




ARVs. In April of that year in a speech in Nigeria, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
picked up their call and sought donor approval for a new special fund to fight AIDS.  
In 2002, donors agreed that a new financing vehicle, the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, TB, and Malaria, should be created, though Washington’s concerns about the 
UN’s administrative capacity ensured that the Global Fund became an independent 
agency. Soon after the Global Fund’s creation, donors created a number of bilateral 
programs of their own. Most notable was President’s Bush five year $15 billion plan 
announced in his 2003 Station of the Union Address. PEPFAR, the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, would become the world’s biggest vehicle for AIDS 
spending. With the creation of the Global Fund and other bilateral and multilateral 
programs, donors rapidly scaled up funding for HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention 
programs, making available about $8.7 billion in 2008 (Kates, Lief, and Avila 2009). 
Treatment received the largest proportion of funds, remarkable given that the extension 
of anti-retroviral therapy (ARV) to the developing world was dismissed as inappropriate 
for developing countries just a few years earlier.
2 While funds from the global 
community only put about three million HIV-positive individuals in middle and low 
income countries on ARV therapy by the end of 2007, this was up from 400,000 at the 
end of December 2003 (WHO 2008b).
3  
Annan’s initial estimate of the need for $8-12 billion annually for global AIDS 
has since been scaled up as the broader devastation of the disease has become clear. 
                                                 
2 The original legislation for PEPFAR, for example, required by law at least 55% of the funds be spent on 
treatment. A May 2007 U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report estimated that 32% of the 
Global Fund’s resources for AIDS were being dedicated to treatment, compared to 30% for prevention, 
14% for care and support, and 24% for other (including health systems capacity strengthening) (GAO 
2007). 
3 As of September 30, 2007, the U.S. estimated that the U.S government was supporting more than an 
estimated 1.44 million people to be on anti-retroviral drug therapy, up from 155,000 in September 2004 




UNAIDS has thus begun to seek support for orphans and for the development of health 
infrastructure and the education of health professionals. In 2008, UNAIDS estimated 
$22.1 billion would be needed that year to combat the epidemic in low and middle-
income countries, but only $15.6 billion was actually provided (Kates, Lief, and Avila 
2009). Still, these financial commitments had grown from almost nothing in the 1990s to 
billions of dollars within a very short period of time, alongside the “political declaration” 
that the international community had made in 2006 to provide universal access to 
treatment. In the next section, we sketch out how unexpected and puzzling this turn to 
universal treatment really was.  
 
Why AIDS Treatment is a Puzzle 
As Evan Lieberman has noted, “"The idea that long-term therapy ought to be 
provided to every person infected with HIV (at a clinical stage when such medication 
would be appropriate) was unimaginable to most global actors, let alone to policymakers 
and activists in the developing world, certainly in the early 1990s, and generally through 
that decade” (Lieberman 2009, 99). Why was this so and what makes the subsequent turn 
to AIDS treatment such a puzzle? In this section we explore some of the reasons for 
considering ARVs a “hard case” for international cooperation in public health. 
First, it must be recalled that medical treatment is not generally based on regimes 
of universal access. Even within the advanced industrial nations, medical treatment is 
often allocated on the basis of income or need. There is, for example, no universal access 
to heart transplants or even to many types of cancer treatment, much less a commitment 




Second, AIDS is not a disease that meets the conditions for eradication. Unlike 
smallpox or polio, there is no vaccine and the prospects for discovery of a vaccine do not 
appear promising any time soon (Brown 2008). Nonetheless, the international community 
embarked on an ambitious agenda to halt the spread of AIDS and keep people with HIV 
alive via treatment. The commitment to AIDS treatment is arguably the most sweeping 
international commitment to global public health since the ill-fated effort to eradicate 
malaria in the aftermath of the Second World War (Yekutiel 1981; Packard 1997). 
Certainly, the scale of funding and attention to AIDS by governments exceeds the 
funding for smallpox and polio. While those campaigns were ambitious, the funds for 
smallpox were trivial by international standards (less than $100 million between 1959-
1979) (Barrett 2006), and the bill for polio was mostly footed by one non-state actor, the 
Rotary Club, which has invested more than $600 million in the endeavor over the past 
couple of decades (Rotary International 2007). Again, the availability of a vaccine in 
these cases meant that effective, relatively low-cost action could be taken on a global 
scale. 
A third issue that makes this case a puzzle is that AIDS treatment is an extremely 
costly commitment. AIDS is costly in part because of the scale of the program but also 
because treatment is ongoing for the life of the patient. The promise of treatment is what 
Mead Over calls an international “entitlement” like Social Security or Medicare in the 
United States. Over estimates that by 2016 the United States alone could be spending as 
much as $12bn per year on treatment in developing countries, equivalent to about half of 




A fourth puzzling aspect of the turn to treatment has been the relative inattention 
paid to prevention, which should in principle be a more efficient approach for attacking 
the disease. Once ARVs became available, extended treatment became the main pillar of 
the international response. PEPFAR, the U.S. bilateral response, was mandated in its first 
five years to spend at least 55% of its funds on treatment and still must spend at least 
50% on treatment and care after the 2008 reauthorization (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2008). The Global Fund, for its part, spends nearly half of its funds on treatment (for all 
three diseases under its purview) (Global Fund Undated). AIDS is a disease that is 
preventable, and the commitment to universal access to treatment ultimately depends on a 
successful prevention strategy, lest the numbers of those needing treatment be beyond the 
capacity of governments to support. Indeed, that has sadly already happened with 
approximately 2.7 million new infections in 2007 (UNAIDS 2008a). Estimates of 
treatment needs accordingly have been revised upwards as the prevention agenda 
succumbed to politicization. 
 A fifth reason why the turn to treatment was so surprising is that the disease has 
historically affected communities that were marginalized from their own societies and/or 
from the international community. The international commitment to treatment is, on its 
face, an unlikely arena for domestic political gain: why would politicians make a 
commitment to poor foreigners, disproportionately from sub-Saharan Africa, for treating 
a disease that has historically been identified domestically in donor countries with groups 
(homosexuals, immigrants, IV drugs users, prostitutes) that have been marginalized and 




A sixth reason why the international AIDS treatment regime is something of a 
puzzle is that it is unclear whether the billions being spent on this program would be the 
first or principal priority of African publics if they were making the policy decisions. In 
the 2002 Afrobarometer polls of Botswana, Uganda, Malawi, Mozambique and South 
Africa, AIDS was not the top priority in any of those countries. Even in Botswana and 
South Africa which boasted some of the highest prevalence levels in the world, AIDS 
was only the third and fourth highest priority respectively. In Uganda and Malawi, AIDS 
was the 11
th and 12
th highest priority identified by their respective publics (de Waal 2006, 
8). Thus, in this sense, the international community has helped steer resources for a 
particular purpose, what Tobin referred to as “specific egalitarianism” (Tobin 1970), in 
ways that reflect donor priorities but perhaps not those of Africans themselves (though 
AIDS sufferers certainly have benefited from this choice). 
Given these reasons, the emergence of an AIDS treatment regime was unlikely 
and unexpected, making an explanation of how it came about all the more compelling, 
both for understanding the past and also, as we discuss in the conclusion, for providing 
some suggestive explanations and lessons for other issue-areas within the broad arena of 
international cooperation.  
 
Making the Market for ARVS 
 
"You can't say to your patients, ‘sorry you are dying of market failure’." - Zackie Achmat, 
Treatment Action Campaign (quoted in d'Adesky 2005) 
 
  As we have seen, the political economy of antiretrovirals evolved considerably 
during the period 1990-2006. Initially, these therapies were only available to those who 




insurance policies provided coverage; in this sense ARVs were quintessential private 
goods, produced by profit-maximizing drug manufacturers for first-world consumers. By 
the turn of the millennium, however, the international community had pledged universal 
access to antiretrovirals, meaning that they could and should be available to everyone 
with AIDS. 
In this section we explore the political economy of the universal access policy. 
More generally, we seek to conceptualize ARVs as a class of “merit goods,” meaning 
goods that are made available to a community of individuals (which could be the world 
population) irrespective of their ability to pay (Musgrave 1959). A distinguishing feature 
of contemporary “global civil society” is its cosmopolitan claim that many goods which 
are now considered to be merit goods in most of the industrial countries or welfare states 
of the north—such as universal access to education—should be available globally to all 
persons as well (see, for example, www.campaignforeducation.org). Understanding the 
politics of how ARVs became merit goods may thus yield broader policy lessons.   
 In this section we take up the task of conceptualizing ARVs as merit goods by 
building a simple analytical framework. We note that merit goods are unlike public goods 
in that they are potentially excludable and rival; once merit good A is produced, it is not 
necessarily available to all consumers, and my consumption of good A may prevent you 
from also consuming it. The lack of access to merit good A can be due to constraints on 
either the supply or demand sides of the equation.  
On the supply side, the market may not produce enough of the good that society 
desires; an example would be provided by particular medical technologies that only serve 




case of ARVs, in a world with a fixed quantity of these drugs, my consumption of a pill 
or capsule means that you cannot also have it. At the same time, companies and health 
providers allocate access to the good by virtue of market prices and insurance. The 
(utilitarian) policy problem is that those who lack the means to purchase these goods may 
be excluded from enjoying them, with the concomitant loss of social welfare.  
 On the demand side of the market for merit goods, the constraints facing 
consumers are both more complicated and more contested by economists; thus, people 
may not demand a certain good—say medical treatment—for different reasons which 
may easily be conflated, including a lack of income, lack of information (about the 
benefits of the treatment), or lack of foresight (about the future consequences of not 
receiving treatment today). In practice, these different constraints may be hard to 
separate; someone with little income at the present time, for example, may have less 
concern about his or her future prospects than someone whose income permits investment 
in expensive medical care.  
It is thus crucial to recognize that merit goods could be, and indeed often are, 
produced by the private sector in something akin to a “free market” setting. As noted 
earlier, merit goods may well display the properties of private goods. Unlike classic 
public goods like clean air and national defense which are non-rival and non-excludable, 
merit goods are more like club goods, exhibiting qualities of both scarcity and 
excludability. The significant ideational and material challenge facing activists and 
policy entrepreneurs who wish to promote universal access to a particular good, 




An interesting case in point along these lines is provided by an “Ivy League” 
university education. The Ivy League schools have traditionally served the American 
elite, largely the children of wealthy families. In recent years, however, these schools 
have moved increasingly toward “need blind” admissions policies, or admission which 
does not take into consideration the financial background of the applicant, in a bid to 
attract more students from the lower economic classes. College applications are thus 
judged on the basis of some (admittedly contested) concept of “merit” like test scores and 
academic achievement in high school. In this sense, the Ivy League universities have 
transformed the educational opportunities they offer individuals from private goods into 
merit goods.  
  Why have the Ivy League universities acted in this way? One theory might be 
that, given their large endowments, which run into the billions of dollars, they acted 
voluntarily to appease their critics before they were taxed by the government (Segarra 
2007). This element of actual or threatened government coercion, we note, is central to 
the merit good thesis, since the private “laws” of supply and demand will fail to satisfy 
society’s demand for goods like health care and education. As we will discuss in more 
detail below, activists may supplant the coercive role of governments by, for example, 
“threatening” private firms (say pharmaceutical manufacturers) with boycotts or with bad 
publicity if they do not promote greater access of goods that they believe should be 
allocated on the basis of merit.   
Why doesn’t society simply transfer income to the poor so that they can buy a 
Harvard education if they so desire? As James Tobin pointed out many years ago, the 




meaning that society is often willing to provide specific interventions (e.g. vouchers and 
food stamps) rather than general income support
4, since the recipients of the merit good 
might not choose to buy the desired amount on their own (Tobin 1970). Another way to 
phrase the merit good argument is in terms of “paternalism,” meaning that some members 
of society (say public officials) know better than other individuals what people really 
need in order to live a better life. The founder of merit good theory, Richard Musgrave 
(1959), put it thus: “While consumer sovereignty is the general rule, situations might 
arise, within the context of a democratic community, where an informed group is justified 
in imposing its decisions upon others…” (Musgrave 1959, 14).  
We note that, in the global context, paternalism often takes the form of “activists” 
or “policy entrepreneurs” in wealthy societies deciding what it is that consumers in “poor 
societies” really need and by providing funding for certain goods and services that 
effectively shape a given society’s consumption in a way that might well be different 
from the consumption that would be generated by consumers who were instead given 
additional income directly. While “paternalism” certainly has a negative connotation, we 
should remember that governments often act paternalistically on behalf of social welfare. 
Thus, mandatory health insurance (as in England) and universal and mandatory primary 
education (as in nearly all the advanced industrial states) provide examples of 
governments violating consumer sovereignty. In short, the production of merit goods 
generally requires some degree of interference in the marketplace in order to match 
supply and demand (Musgrave 1959).  Below, we will discuss in greater detail the 
                                                 




specific types of interference in markets that might be required in order to match merit 
good production and consumption. 
Crucial to the merit good framework that we will elaborate is the assumption of a 
society H in which some members (call them “activists” although they might also be 
called “policy entrepreneurs”) are altruistic (Rotemberg 2008), meaning that their utility 
function is given by U = (U
i, U
f), where U
i refers to the individual’s “own” utility and U
f 
refers to the utility of someone else, say “the global poor.” More generally, we suppose 
that society H gets utility from the consumption of merit goods (m) both at home (H) and 
abroad (F), such that H = U (m
H
, m
F). Suppose further that m is produced by a monopolist 
(Z) in the home country (say a pharmaceutical company) whose profits are given by 
marginal revenues (MR) that are greater than marginal costs (MC), so that: 
Z = π = (MR ≥ MC). We also assume that the demand for the merit good (such as a drug) 
is price inelastic, so that η < 1, allowing Z to make a significant rent from the sale of m. 
Indeed, given Z’s objective of profit maximization and the prices that it sets for m, there 
are large numbers of consumers who are unable to purchase the good due to insufficient 
income. 
   Now when activists analyze this situation with respect to m, they find that there is 
“under-consumption” of the good, meaning less consumption than they deem socially 
desirable. From a merit goods perspective, therefore, the fundamental challenge for our 
altruists (qua activists or policy entrepreneurs) is to increase consumption of m by the 
“deserving poor.”  This, however, requires a series of actions on both the demand and 




  On the supply side, it is apparent that several possible solutions present 
themselves, assuming for the moment that constrained demand or under-consumption is 
mainly a function of high prices or inadequate incomes; more on this point below. First, 
society H can raise taxes (T) in order to transfer income to F via foreign aid, enabling F 
to buy more of the merit good at the home price. The political challenge here is that the 
“least advantaged” and non-altruistic members of H, qua voters, must agree that transfers 
to F work to their benefit. 
Second, society H can induce donations from wealthy individuals (e.g. via tax 
breaks) to pay for the merit goods which are then transferred overseas to F; here, an 
organization like the Gates Foundation comes to mind, which uses funds donated by Bill 
Gates and Warren Buffett to fund all sorts of developing world needs in such areas as 
health care and education (see www.gatesfoundation.org). However, the funding from 
such organizations is likely to be small compared to level of global needs that exist. 
Third, society H can induce its firms Z to donate the merit goods to society F; this 
approach will have similar shortcomings to those noted above with any philanthropy, 
with the added problem being that corporate donations may ebb and flow depending upon 
general market conditions.  
Fourth, society H can produce the merit good in question and then donate it 
overseas, or it can encourage competition from other producers (e.g. generic 
manufacturers in the case of drugs) so that the monopoly price falls to the level of 
marginal cost, say by reducing the amount of intellectual property protection that the 




Fifth and finally, H can encourage Z to engage in “differential pricing” of the 
merit good such that prices in society F are lower than they are in the home market. As 
we will see, it is the combination of solutions four and five—generic competition and 
differential pricing—that became the economic basis for ARV delivery in the developing 
world. 
  Why is that the case?  The argument made by ARV activists at the turn of the 
millennium was that drug donation and charitable giving programs were basically “not 
sustainable” (Consumer Project on Technology (CPT) et al. 2001). Sustainability, the 
activists claimed, required a pricing scheme that reconciled the needs of the poor for 
cheap drugs with incentives to induce the pharmaceutical companies to continue their 
investments in research and development (R&D). Differential pricing, with the price in 
developing countries equal to something like marginal cost, was touted as reconciling 
profits with the provision of merit goods (Kremer 2002). 
  In making the case for differential pricing, the activists rightly claimed that drug 
companies had long practiced price discrimination across the world’s various markets for 
their pharmaceutical products. In many European countries, for example, the government 
bargained with the companies over drug prices as they made purchasers on behalf of 
national health systems. In the United States, in contrast, drug purchases remained 
fragmented, and in essence American consumers provided international drug markets 
with something like “hegemonic stability,” effectively subsidizing pharmaceutical R&D 
for the entire world with the high prices they paid at the pharmacy. 
  Supporting the activists in this line of reasoning was an ongoing research program 




Towse and Lanjouw and Jack made the analytical case that differential or Ramsey pricing 
reconciled the needs of profit-seeking firms with the demands of the poor for low-cost 
drugs (Danzon and Towse 2003; Jack and Lanjouw 2005). These scholars pointed out 
that many regulated industries adopted “Ramsey pricing,” in which different prices were 
set for different classes of consumers. On both ethical and economic grounds, therefore, 
Ramsey pricing seemed to provide the most promising framework for achieving universal 
access to ARVs. 
  Ramsey pricing works as follows. Suppose the firm’s objective function is to 
maximize profits such that R = (Σ p-c): where R (revenue) = the sum of p (prices) – c 
(costs). We assume that the company produces everywhere at the same marginal cost 
and, as previously noted, the firm exercises monopoly power, say through a patent. If it 
exercises monopoly power it can therefore price differently in each market so long as it 
can effectively segment these markets
5, setting high prices where the price elasticity is 
low and lower prices as the price elasticity rises. Many utilities, for example, price water 
and electricity in this way; industrial consumers that require these utilities in order to 
produce goods and services often pay higher prices than households. 
  The question then arises: if a monopolist will “naturally” engage in Ramsey 
pricing, why didn’t the pharmaceutical industry follow suit by offering low prices for 
ARVs to the developing world at the outset of the AIDS crisis? There are several reasons 
as to why the drug companies did not act in this way. To begin with, the multinational 
pharmaceutical companies doubted whether the developing world even provided a market 
for these drugs at any price, given the limitations of the existing health infrastructure 
                                                 




coupled with skepticism about whether patients would follow a strict treatment regimen. 
They also doubted whether they could enforce market segmentation and prevent the re-
exportation of low-cost drugs back to the industrial world. There were thus supply side 
constraints that prevented firms from promoting the globalization of ARV treatment.  
  On the demand side, poor countries had no interest in importing high-cost ARVs 
because the price was much more than they could afford. Further, the absence or 
deficiencies in health infrastructure meant that extending access entailed substantial costs 
beyond the purchase of drugs, placing a strain on stretched health budgets; and in any 
event, it was unclear whether ARV purchases would be or even should be the first 
priority of developing world health ministries. Even if they were, procurement and 
delivery mechanisms would have to, in many cases, be created from scratch, delivering 
drugs to rural areas over poor roads, with irregular electricity to areas that needed clinics 
and storehouses and procedures to manage all of that activity (Kremer 2002, summarizes 
market failures for pharmaceuticals in the developing world).   
Alongside these considerations, there was also a widespread perception—often 
articulated even by those in positions of authority—that the victims of AIDS in the 
developing world, notably in Africa, lacked the behavioral attributes necessary to make 
ARV treatment effective. USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios famously argued in 
2001 against treatment on the grounds that in Africa, “People do not know what watches 
and clocks are. They do not use Western means for telling time. They use the sun” 
(House International Relations Committee 2001). A vicious circle was thus created which 




Essentially, policy entrepreneurs like Peter Piot of UNAIDS—along with activists 
based within such organizations as Doctors without Borders, Partners in Health, Oxfam 
and later the Clinton Foundation—brought together the pharmaceutical manufacturers 
with developing world governments by negotiating the lower prices at which demand 
would kick in and by showing through “proof of concept” demonstration efforts that 
ARV uptake was medically feasible in poor country settings.  In 1997, Brazil began to 
provide ARV therapy to people with HIV, including locally manufactured generic drugs, 
while in Haiti, Partners in Health led by Dr. Paul Farmer extended treatment to another 
resource poor setting.  Among the other significant programs in this respect was the UN’s 
Drug Access Initiative of 1997-1998 which used Cote D’Ivoire, Vietnam, Thailand, and 
Chile as pilot countries for exploring the feasibility of universal access to treatment 
(UNAIDS 1998). So long as the prices paid by governments or philanthropies covered 
production costs, at least some firms would be prepared to increase output; and so long as 
prices were low enough the countries (perhaps using foreign aid funds) would be able to 
buy the drugs. Again, the role of the activists was to construct the market for merit goods 
by matching demand and supply. On the supply side, drug companies were encouraged to 
lower the prices on their patented ARVs while generic drug suppliers were encouraged to 
enter developing world markets. On the demand side, activists won substantially higher 
amounts of foreign aid funding from the United States and other industrial world 
governments, specifically targeted at ARV purchases. 
  Indeed, the activists’ cause of advancing universal access was, paradoxically, 
assisted by ongoing developments regarding the Trade in Intellectual Property Rights 




application to public health. These provisions required all members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), including developing countries, to put into place effective 
protections on intellectual property (IP), including patents on pharmaceutical products. 
The least developed countries, however, were given until 2006 (later extended to 2016) to 
create enforceable TRIPS mechanisms. The TRIPS agreement allowed countries in 
principle to retain the possibility of issuing compulsory licenses for drugs to generic 
manufacturers, requiring them only to do so (1) with specific review and authorization, 
(2) that rights holders be compensated and (3) that a reasonable attempt to obtain a 
voluntary license had to be made. In instances of national emergencies, countries did not 
even have to seek a voluntary license from manufacturers (Fink 2008). However, 
pressure from the United States and other advanced countries to protect IP and limit the 
use of compulsory licensing made developing countries less secure about what rights they 
effectively possessed under TRIPS. This lack of clarity would give rise to the 2001 Doha 
health exception, which specified what rights developing countries had with respect to 
pharmaceuticals drugs and health emergencies. The 2001 exception only specified the 
rights of producing countries to grant compulsory licenses, and a TRIPS waiver for poor 
countries that lacked manufacturing capacity to import generics drugs from abroad was 
negotiated in August 2003 (Fink 2005; Fink and Elliott 2008; Elliott and Fink 2008).   
  South Africa’s experience in the late 1990s with aggressive IP protection by 
pharmaceuticals companies and rich country governments set the stage for the important 
developments in 2001 and 2003 that would enshrine more explicit protection of 
developing country rights with respect to health and pharmaceuticals. In 1997, South 




patented drugs through parallel importation and compulsory licensing, which would 
potentially have enabled the South African government to import low-cost generic 
versions of ARVs from abroad. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa (made up of the multinational drug companies) sued the Government over the 
Medicines Act, with the support of the United States and European Union, both of which 
tried to pressure the government to rescind the Act. The suit and these pressures were 
hugely counter-productive, in that they unleashed a massive activist campaign against the 
pharmaceutical industry, which won sympathy even from the likes of The Wall Street 
Journal (Cooper, Zimmerman, and McGinley 2001). By 2001, in the face of continuing 
opposition, the industry dropped this suit. 
  In the meantime, as a Federal Reserve Bank of New York economist reported, 
“Indian and Brazilian generics companies’ low prices began to put pressure on originator 
companies to reduce their prices in low- and medium-income countries. For example, 
competition from generics producers…forced the average branded price of an AIDS 
triple-combination therapy from $10,439 per year to less than $1,000 per year in 2000” 
(Hellerstein 2004). As Table 1 suggests, the price of three out of four “first-line” 
cocktails has fallen substantially since 2004 (and indeed since 2001) thanks to pressure 
from generic competition, coupled with bulk purchases made possible by such 
organizations as the Clinton Foundation. 
  As prices fell, activists moved to increase public (and charitable) spending to buy 
antiretrovirals for those with AIDS in the developing world. Two major programs would 
be launched with this objective in mind: first, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 




Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). These vehicles have since become by far 
the world’s largest sources of funding for AIDS treatment and prevention programs. The 
Global Fund was created as a separate institution outside UNAIDS largely because the 
United States did not trust the United Nations to run a major, heavily funded new 
program (Kazatchkine 2009). For its part, PEPFAR represented a coalition of political 
interests that bridged AIDS activists and development campaigners on the left with the 
evangelical community on the right that had found religious motivation in helping those 
with HIV. A notable example is provided by Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham and 
head of Samaritans’ Purse, a Christian relief charity, who brought long-time critics of 
foreign aid like Senator Jesse Helms to believe that addressing AIDS was a moral calling 
for all evangelists. Another key figure who helped build this bridge was none other than 
Bono, who, as already noted could talk “Christian to Christian” with political leaders like 
President Bush and Senator Helms, while holding his own with those focused more on 
the disease and, in particular, on its ravaging effects in Africa (Busby 2007; Gerson 2007; 
Burkhalter 2004; Lefkowitz 2009; Behrman 2004; Dietrich 2005). 
  In short, the goal of creating a universal access regime required that both the 
material and the ideational pieces of this political campaign fall into place. On the 
material side, advocates needed to overcome the market failures that discouraged 
producers from supplying drugs to the developing world and that prevented poor 
consumers from obtaining access. Prices were a significant barrier, but concerns about 
efficacy and infrastructure presented additional impediments to extending access to 
treatment. But changing the material context also required an ideological commitment to 




people had a right to ARV treatment—that ARVs were indeed merit goods—the global 
fight against AIDS may well have languished. As we will see in the following section, 
that ethical motivation translated into political opportunities for leaders to support the 
cause of universal access, particularly in the United States.  
 
Why the AIDS Treatment Campaign Succeeded 
 
The success of the AIDS advocacy movement in generating a massive scale-up of 
ARV treatment naturally leads to the question, why was this particular campaign 
successful while many others both within and outside global health policy (e.g. the 
elimination of small arms, the reduction of carbon emissions; the Save Darfur Coalition) 
have failed or enjoyed much less success? Put a little differently, if the AIDS campaign 
was ultimately about the idea of universal treatment being accepted and championed by 
the international community, why did this policy gain support when many other worthy 
causes have languished in relative obscurity?  
This question is among the most important questions facing scholars of social 
movements and non-state actors (Price 2003). It also is of intense interest for other 
campaigns for global public health and international development that all are seeking to 
emulate the success of the AIDS campaign. We provide a provisional answer to this 
question in this final section. 
As we have already argued, activists have to bring together the material and the 
moral/ideational pieces of a campaign in order to build coalitions that influence public 
policy. They not only have to convince policymakers that what the advocacy campaign 
recommends can be done, they must  also must convince them that it should be done. We 




AIDS case, starting with the material conditions that supported the building of a universal 
access to treatment regime. 
 
Permissive Material Conditions 
  While moral and ideational motivations may sometimes convince policymakers to 
embrace costly commitments (Busby 2007), campaigners must also often make utilitarian 
or cost-benefit arguments that they are not throwing taxpayer funds down the proverbial 
rat-hole. To that end, even if HIV/AIDS did not exhibit the characteristics necessary for 
successful disease eradication, like smallpox or polio, the proof of concept 
demonstrations in Brazil, Haiti, and other countries succeeded in showing treatment 
could be effective in the developing world. These early programs were especially 
important in overturning the presumption that poor people would not adhere to the drug 
regimen as faithfully as those in the advanced welfare states. The dramatic decline in 
drug prices brought about by competition from generic ARV suppliers also persuaded 
policymakers that treatment was now within the realm of affordability. Further, unlike 
prevention programs, the number of ARV treatments being provided to patients could 
readily be counted; politicians could thus set numerical targets whose progress could 
easily be followed.  
Furthermore, the ARV campaign was critically helped by the growth of the global 
economy during the early 2000s. The counterfactual we have to ask ourselves is this: if 
the movement for access to treatment was mobilizing for the first time in 2009, in the 
midst of the worst global economic downturn in decades, would donor countries be as 




education now seek to replicate the success of AIDS campaigners, it will be interesting to 
see if the structural conditions in the global economy put those goals out of reach.
6 
Still, despite the favorable circumstances fostered by the combination of 
successful demonstration projects, declining drug prices, and a healthy global economy, a 
permissive material context was not enough to build a broad political coalition in support 
of the campaigners’ aims. Why did decision-makers decide to promote and fund AIDS 
programs and not something else? It is this question to which we now turn. 
 
The Politics of AIDS Treatment  
Potentially, there are a number of different answers to explain why AIDS 
treatment campaigners were able to convert permissive material conditions into 
widespread political support. In this section, we examine several possibilities that have 
been offered in the literature: the degree of policy consensus; the attributes and expertise 
of AIDS activists; and, related, the messages and frames provided by the treatment 
campaign. We suggest that none of these on their own is sufficient to explain the 
emergence of the access to treatment regime; instead, AIDS activists relied on each factor 
as they worked to forge a broad political coalition. 
  
Degree of Policy Consensus.  
Shiffman and Smith have examined in detail the tragic failure of campaigners to win 
enhanced international support to protect maternal mortality (Shiffman and Smith 2007; 
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Youde 2008, discusses the failure of the universal primary health care norm).  Their 
ultimate conclusion was that campaigners lacked consensus on a policy prescription. 
When too many ideas are at play, policy change is less likely. Thus, if this hypothesis is 
correct, the AIDS treatment campaign was ultimately successful because the movement 
coalesced towards a single consensus view of what was needed—greater access to 
ARVs—while other health concerns and other campaigns for maternal mortality or 
population control have lacked a single defining prescription.  
To that end, the success of treatment could be contrasted with the AIDS 
prevention agenda, which has been much more politicized and divided between 
conservative voices that support abstinence and liberals that support condom use. 
Inspired by Uganda’s success, campaigners sought an overarching approach to 
prevention that tied these concerns together (the ABC campaign of Abstinence, Be 
faithful, and Condoms). However, this agenda has failed to capture unanimity of purpose 
among campaigners and arguably the prevention agenda has faltered in the field.  
While an argument focusing on the degree of policy cohesion is attractive in its 
simplicity, it cannot alone explain why decision-makers would be persuaded to support 
movement aims. After all, as Pranab Bardhan points out, there is a fair degree of cohesion 
around the correct treatment for children dying from diarrhea—oral rehydration 
therapy—and yet here is another case where the campaign for greater access to treatment 
has failed to capture the attention of senior policy leaders.
7 Cohesion may be a necessary 
condition for movement success, but it is probably insufficient.   
 
                                                 




Activist Attributes and Expertise.  
While generally frowned upon as an explanation in the political science literature, it is 
difficult to deny that much of the ARV treatment regime’s relative success ultimately has 
to do with the quality of the individuals involved in this campaign, just as it would be 
hard to imagine modern Singapore without Lee Kuan Yew or South Africa without 
Nelson Mandela. One could argue that the characters involved in this story, such as Peter 
Piot, Bono, Franklin Graham, Paul Farmer, Jonathan Mann, and many others, had 
unusually strong persuasive skills. They combined substantive expertise with evangelical 
fervor, and they also exploited diffuse social networks that extended throughout the 
political and economic realms.  
However, that observation begs the question about what attributes of their 
personality or expertise gave them such influence. Busby provides a partial explanation 
based on the individual attributes of these campaigners, drawing on findings from 
political psychology. He suggests that advocates like the evangelist Franklin Graham 
were persuasive because they shared a number of attributes (religion, ideology, gender, 
age) in common with key decision-makers like George W. Bush. And for his part, Bono 
was able to exploit his shared religious beliefs with Bush and many leaders of Congress 
(Busby Unpublished manuscript). 
A different argument about advocate characteristics would focus on the shared 
scientific expertise of medical professionals (Haas 1992). As already noted, AIDS experts 
like Peter Piot and Paul Farmer were converted early to the belief that ARV treatment 
should be extended globally, and they helped create an “epistemic community” of like-




world that are responsible for as many, if not more premature deaths than AIDS, and 
whose solutions are relatively straightforward. As previously noted, diarrheal disease—
which can readily be reduced by access to clean water and better sanitation and for which 
effective treatments already exist—killed 1.81 million people in 2004 compared to 1.51 
million who died from AIDS (WHO 2008a).  
Where is the campaign to end infant deaths from diarrhea? Why were decision-
makers compelled to act on AIDS and not these other causes? As climate scientists have 
discovered, scientific expertise, on its own, is often not enough to convince decision-
makers to act. Other arguments other than the basic facts of the situation are often needed 
to persuade decision-makers that action is necessary.  
 
Messages/Frames.  
Another way, therefore, to explain the AIDS campaign’s success is to look at advocates’ 
messages and how they framed the problem. Only a handful of issues rise to the attention 
of busy policymakers. Whether an issue gets their attention is sensitive to the episodic 
flow of events and crises. Even when annual gatherings like the Group of Eight (G-8) 
summit focuses decision-makers’ attention on causes to promote, these causes do not 
arise spontaneously. Activists are required to champion a problem, frame how it is 
interpreted, and suggest possible remedies.
8  
Frames can tap into different logics. A frame that suggests “AIDS is a national 
security threat” seeks to legitimate a certain causal belief about the disease’s 
consequences and its implications for the target’s interests. By contrast, a frame that 
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suggests “AIDS demands compassion for the sufferers” is governed more by a logic of 
appropriateness.
9  
While advocacy groups often adopt a dominant frame, they may also employ 
multiple messages to appeal to different groups, building political coalitions in the 
process. For example, HIV/AIDS has been framed as a public health issue, a human 
rights issue, a justice issue, a moral problem, an issue of intellectual property rights, and a 
security problem. The ethical/human rights-based argument was perhaps the most central 
frame that animated advocates’ demands internationally (though security arguments were 
far from trivial at the United Nations—see Behrman 2004), but there has been some local 
variation, with the moral frame having a decidedly more Christian religious flavor in the 
United States. Framing can determine whether political coalitions will be built, whether 
the issue in question then gets on the agenda, and what policy instruments and resources 
are mustered to address the problem.  
However, as critics of framing arguments have pointed out, what determines why 
one particular frame wins, particularly when frames are competing against each other 
(Payne 2001)? Thus far, scholars of framing have yet to offer an adequate answer to this 
question.  
 
Building Coalitions and Overcoming Opposition. 
 
We try to pull these disparate ideas together by focusing on the role of political 
coalitions and on the strength of the opposition. In order to succeed politically, 
campaigns have to have broad support while overcoming the major sources of potential 
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political opposition. From this perspective, the nature of the issue area can have a big 
effect on the relative success of different campaigns by changing the balance between 
coalitions and opponents. For example, advocates of climate change policy have sought 
to build a broad coalition drawn from both environmental and industrial groups—and 
increasingly from evangelical organizations as well—but they have confronted influential 
interest groups in the power generation sector. Much of the active opposition to AIDS 
treatment, however, had been largely nullified by the turn of the millennium, at least in 
the industrial world (ironically, this was not the case in countries like South Africa, where 
public officials continued to dispute the efficacy of the ARV regimen).  
Who were the potential opponents of extending AIDS treatment programs? These 
included pharmaceuticals companies that were worried about profits, social conservatives 
who identified AIDS with a sinners’ disease, and fiscal conservatives opposed to foreign 
aid spending.  While an exhaustive analysis of the way AIDS campaigners muted or 
transformed the opposition is beyond the scope of this paper, the important point to 
takeaway is that AIDS activists succeeded by reducing the political costs of supporting 
AIDS treatment. By creating a campaign with some cachet on both left and right, AIDS 
activists made their cause broadly attractive. Given that the potential opposition in the 
United States was concentrated on the political right, it was especially important to make 
in-roads among evangelicals and social and fiscal conservatives who could vouch for the 
policy. A synthetic account of how activists succeeded would focus on key countries like 
the United States and marry the discussion of activists with messages and focus on the 




“gatekeepers” like the conservative Senator Jesse Helms of the Foreign Relations 
Committee (Busby Unpublished manuscript). 
In sum, we would expect campaigns to be more successful when they (1) enjoy 
permissive materials conditions; (2) provide a coherent policy prescription; and (3) build 
a broad political coalition on the one hand while facing few influential political 
opponents on the other. With the AIDS case, activists were favored along each of these 
three dimensions. However, given the rising financial costs of cutting-edge “second line 
therapy,” continuing disappointment with the prevention agenda, the soaring numbers of 
people needing treatment, and the deterioration in the global economy, we share Mead 
Over’s concerns about whether the AIDS treatment regime is sustainable over the long-




In this paper, we have demonstrated the role of activists and policy entrepreneurs 
in building a market for ARVs in the developing world. By naming and shaming 
pharmaceutical companies and by promoting generics, the price of this treatment was 
greatly reduced, making the goal of universal access seemingly feasible rather than “pie 
in the sky.” With lower prices, the activists pressured governments to provide more 
foreign assistance for the purchase of ARVs, bringing the supply and demand sides of the 
equation together. Activists thus succeeded in transforming ARVs from private goods 
into merit goods that everyone had the right to consume.  
In thinking about the future, the AIDS treatment campaign raises several 
important questions for policymakers. First, can ARV treatment access continue to be 




access is currently limited and highly unequally distributed internationally? And third, 
can other campaigns (e.g. for universal access to education and clean water) replicate the 
success of the AIDS treatment campaign politically?   
With respect to maintaining and extending ARV access, the answer is not a 
simple one. To the extent that the virus that causes AIDS will continue to mutate and 
generate drug resistance, branded pharmaceuticals companies are needed to develop new 
drug therapies for AIDS. These companies continue to press for maximal protection of 
intellectual property rights, and as drug resistance among first-line ARV drugs becomes 
more prevalent, it will become increasingly expensive to provide second line drugs, since 
these are facing less competition from generic producers.  
At the same time, the failure of AIDS prevention strategies is straining budgets at 
a time when governments are under unprecedented pressure to cut costs. For these 
reasons, a growing number of observers are expressing concern about the future 
sustainability of the global AIDS regime (Over 2008). Reneging on the commitments 
made to the more than three million people on ARV therapy would be morally 
indefensible. But advocates for AIDS broadly need to spur a renewed focus on prevention 
since the funds available for treatment will never be large enough to cover those in need, 
so long as the HIV positive community continues to swell.  
This raises the question of whether the case of ARVs could or should be extended 
to other domains, in health or potentially other issue-areas. Drug companies have no 
incentive to invest in cures or treatment therapy for so-called orphan diseases like 
malaria, Chagas disease, and filariasis, primarily because advanced industrialized 




Foundation as well as official donor money will be required to incentivize the production 
of drugs for those diseases. For differential pricing of medicines to work, there needs to 
be a reservoir of rich country consumers who are willing to pay monopoly prices while 
subsidizing the rest of the world’s consumption. Interestingly, activists like those from 
the Lance Armstrong Foundation are beginning to globalize their struggle for cancer 
treatment along these lines (Lance Armstrong Foundation Undated). But as we have 
shown, differential pricing can only work in this and other arenas (such as seeds, books, 
and software) if activists are successful in making a case for this scheme with a broad 
coalition of interests.  Inevitably, this will require some efforts to bring in the private 
sector generators (and copiers) of this intellectual property, and in many cases, this will 
require overcoming market failures on both the demand and supply side.  
Economists typically see the emergence of differential pricing as a “natural” 
market response to monopolistic production, citing the pricing practices of 
pharmaceutical companies as a paradigmatic case. But there is a world of difference 
between selling drugs at somewhat lower prices in Canada than in the United States 
(because of the differing role played by government in these countries in negotiating with 
the manufacturers) and in selling them at close to or at marginal cost. When asked why 
his company had reduced the prices of ARVs in developing countries, for example, the 
CEO of Abbott Laboratories said: “Frankly, because it is required. If I don’t provide our 
products in Africa, governments will license our intellectual property to others who can. 
Governments will intervene. Make no mistake, they will do that” (Quoted in Shadlen 
2007, 576). As these comments suggest, the market for ARVs was a political no less than 




within it) are to play a more expanded role in other areas, then policymakers may need to 
build institutions that enable the private sector to embrace this scheme (for example by 
ensuring effective market segmentation and protecting property rights) in order to avoid 
some of the more bruising confrontations between advocates and the business 
community.  
The metaphor of extended access is itself being extended to new domains, like 
education and water where activists have seized upon the AIDS treatment campaign’s 
success for inspiration. Unlike medicines (and software and seeds), education and water 
are largely location-specific: they are not transferable from advanced world markets even 
if there are positive externalities associated with investing in these sectors. In these cases, 
however, differential pricing is unavailable as a model. Thus, the solution set for both 
problems is even more dependent upon donor financing and idiosyncratic local 
implementation than the AIDS treatment regime. That may not prevent either cause from 
mustering political support, but it is interesting to note that very specific development 
programs (like PEPFAR) are much more politically popular than broad-based financial 
assistance to well-run governments to spend as they see fit (i.e. the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation). That said, at a time when donor governments’ foreign assistance budgets 
are already strained, campaigns for extended access will have to compete with a 
profusion of other issues for attention.  
In conclusion, if activists are to succeed, they must bring together a broad 
coalition of interests as they transform private goods into merit goods that are available to 
all. This coalition, in turn, must be joined by a convergent idea of what can and should be 




should work with favorable material conditions that activists will bring change to the 





Table 1: Median price (United States dollars) of first-line antiretroviral drug 
regimens in low-income countries, 2004-2007 
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